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This paper studies the distribution of labour earnings among employees within the EU 
using  data from Wave 2007-1 of the Community Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EUSILC).  The review of available information and the comparisons with 
external sources show that the EU-SILC data are not exempt from problems, particularly 
in some countries, yet can be fruitfully used to study the distribution of earnings in the 
EU; they also allow researchers to assess the sensitivity of results to various concepts of 
labour earnings. The ranking of countries by median full-time equivalent monthly gross 
earnings shows Eastern European nations at the bottom and Luxembourg at the top; 
earnings differences are sizeable, both across and within countries. Taking the euro area 
and the EU-25 (excluding Malta, for which data are unavailable) as a whole, inequality is 
higher when earnings are measured in euro at market rates rather than at purchasing power 
parities. The wage distribution is wider in the EU-25 than in the euro area, which is not 
surprising given that the former includes the poorer  Eastern European countries that 
joined the Union in 2004. The higher inequality observed in  the EU-25 is largely 
attributable to differences between countries, which are essentially due to the returns to 
individual attributes rather than to a different composition of the workforce with respect 
to these attributes. 
 
Keywords: wage inequality, EU and euro area labour markets. 
JEL Classification: J31, D33.  
 
                                                 
* This paper was prepared for the research project “Network for the Analysis of EU-SILC” (Net-SILC) 
coordinated by Eric Marlier. We would like to thank Tony Atkinson, Francesco Figari, Eric Marlier, John 
Micklewright and participants in the 2010 International Conference on “Comparative EU Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions” (Warsaw, 25-26 March 2010) for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
The views expressed here are solely ours; in particular, they do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of 
Italy. 
† Address of correspondence: ANDREA.BRANDOLINI@bancaditalia.it    2 
1. Introduction 
 
  Easing the movements of workers and creating a more integrated labour market have 
been  long standing  aims  of  the  European  unification  process.  These  objectives  have  been 
recently  reiterated  in  the  proposed  new  EU  strategy  “Europe  2020”,  which  assigns  the 
Commission the responsibility “to facilitate and promote intra EU labour mobility and better 
match labour supply with demand with appropriate financial support from the structural funds, 
… and to promote a forward looking and comprehensive labour migration policy which would 
respond  in  a  flexible  way  to  the  priorities  and  needs  of  labour  markets”  (European 
Commission  2010,  page  17).  The  importance  of  these  policy  objectives  can  hardly  be 
overestimated for both the social cohesion and the macroeconomic stability of the Union, as 
the financial turmoil in Europe of Spring 2010 has dramatically confirmed. 
  The integration process has been constantly monitored by EU institutions, especially 
since  the  Lisbon  strategy  set  targets  for  the  European  Union  (EU)  as  a  whole,  and  has 
stimulated a thriving body of academic and institutional research.
2 Yet, our knowledge of the 
structure and the determinants of wages and salaries at the microeconomic level is surprisingly 
limited for the EU. How different are pay entry levels across EU countries? How important is 
tenure for wage progression in Member States? Which countries pay the highest returns to 
education? How has the EU wide wage distribution changed over time? These and similar 
questions are difficult to answer, despite their analytical importance for assessing the actual 
integration of EU labour markets and their practical relevance for people who decide to move 
within the Union.
3  
  The main reason for this gap in our knowledge is the paucity of suitable data. While 
great progress has been achieved in improving cross country comparability of microeconomic 
information  on  household  incomes,
4  advancement  has  been  much  slower  for  wages.  Even 
within Europe, where the joint effort of Eurostat and national statistical offices has greatly 
enhanced data standardisation, sources of comparable individual data on earnings are scant.
5 
Data from administrative archives for multiple countries are virtually impossible to access, and 
in  any  case  they  would  reflect  national  practices  calling  for  a  painstaking  process  of 
harmonisation. The collection of earnings data in the Labour Force Survey is mandatory only 
                                                 
2 Throughout, we indicate by EU the European Union in general, and by EU 27, EU 25 and EU 15 the current 
union comprising 27 members, the Union as of 2006 (even where Malta is missing) and the union before the 
enlargement in 2004, respectively. The euro area comprises all 12 member countries of the monetary union in 
2006 (AT, BE, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT). 
3 This compares with a greater attention for the distribution of household incomes. For instance, the area wide 
income distribution is examined by Atkinson (1996), Beblo and Knaus (2001), Boix (2004) and Brandolini 
(2007), while the impact of the monetary union on within country income inequality is investigated by Bertola 
(2010). 
4  Progress  concerns  both  the  availability  of  microdata,  and  the  setting  of  methodological  guidelines.  Two 
examples of influential international data collection enterprises are the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The LIS project has made available to researchers since 
1983  a  micro database  containing  social  and  economic  data  collected  in  household  surveys from different 
countries  and  harmonised  ex  post  (http://www.lisproject.org).  The  ECHP  was  a  fully  harmonised  annual 
longitudinal survey conducted by national statistical offices from 1994 to 2001 under Eurostat coordination; it 
has been subsequently replaced by the EU SILC. On the methodological side, mention should be made of the 
report published in 2001 by the Expert Group on Household Income Statistics, known as the Canberra Group, 
which provides guidance to compilers and data analysts on how to prepare comparable statistics on income 
distribution. 
5 The problems affecting the cross country comparability of earnings data are further discussed by Atkinson 
and Brandolini (2007) and Atkinson (2008).   3 
since the end of 2007,
6 and data have not been released yet. The Structure of Earnings Survey 
(SES) provides, every four years, harmonised data on gross earnings and hours paid used by 
Eurostat to estimate statistics on the distribution of earnings (e.g. Casali and Alvarez Gonzalez 
2010),  but  its  coverage  of  sectors and firms is partial and the access to microdata highly 
restricted.
7  Only  recently  a  suitable  source  has  become  available  with  the  release  of  the 
Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) (Clemenceau and Museux 
2007).
8 
  Problems are however not confined to data availability. Three conceptual issues arise 
in the analysis of the EU wide distribution of labour earnings. First, we need to identify the 
population which is the object of the analysis. The major distinction is between employees and 
the self employed, but other distinctions may relate to the type of work contract or to the sex 
and age of workers. Second, we have to fix the concept of labour income as regards the 
treatment  of  social  security  contributions  and  income  taxes.  For  employees,  we  may 
distinguish total compensation, a measure of the overall cost incurred by employers, gross 
earnings, obtained after deducing social security contributions paid by employers from the 
total  compensation,  and  net  earnings,  that  is  the  take home  pay,  or  the  part  of  labour 
remuneration  that  employees  can  actually  spend  after  income  taxes  and  social  insurance 
contributions are paid out of their earnings.
9 The first concept is the most pertinent in the 
analysis of labour demand, for instance to assess the comparative costs of hiring people across 
EU countries, whereas the last concept has obvious bearings on the decision of people to 
move within the Union. Third, we must choose how to convert nominal values into “real” 
values which are expressed in a common unit, for countries outside the euro area, and may be 
adjusted for differences in the cost of living across, and perhaps within, countries.  
  Our aim in this paper is to deal with these questions in order to estimate the EU wide 
distribution of labour earnings on the basis of the EU SILC data. We focus on employees 
only, largely because the information collected on wages and salaries tends to be more reliable 
than that on income from self employment. This is common in the labour literature, but the 
resulting picture is necessarily incomplete and possibly biased by the varying importance of 
self employment in the different EU countries.
10 In the next two Sections we review in some 
depth the EU SILC information on employees’ earnings and summarily assess its quality by 
means of a comparison with the national accounts and the average tax wedge calculated by 
Eurostat. In Section 4 we deal with two further measurement issues: the time unit of earnings 
(annual  vs.  monthly),  and  the  rates  of  conversion  from  national  currencies  into  euro.  In 
Section 5 we present statistics for the wage distribution in EU countries and exploit the rich 
                                                 
6  See Regulation (EC) No 1372/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 577/98 on the organisation of a labour force sample survey in the 
Community. 
7  The  SES  excludes  agriculture,  fishing,  public  administration,  private  households  and  extra territorial 
organizations as well as enterprises with less than 10 employees. Access to microdata is “in principle” allowed 
for 14 EU countries plus Norway, and is currently only possible through the SAFE Centre at the Eurostat 
premises in Luxembourg (Eurostat 2010). Unsurprisingly, country coverage is limited to less than ten countries 
in the analyses of the wage distribution based on this survey (e.g. Christopoulou, Jimeno and Lamo 2010; 
Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx 2007; Simón 2005, 2010).  
8 Analysis for the EU 15 in the 1990s could be performed using the ECHP data. See Behr and Pötter (2010) for 
an example. 
9  In  the  national  accounts, the first two concepts correspond to “Compensation of employees” and “Gross 
wages and salaries”, while the third concept has no counterpart. 
10 According to labour force statistics, in 2009 the share in total employment of the self employed (including 
family workers) ranged from 8 9 per cent in Denmark, Estonia and Luxembourg to 25 per cent in Italy and 33 
36 per cent in Greece and Romania. On the determinants of the self employment share see Torrini (2005).   4 
information collected in the EU SILC to show the sensitivity of the results to the various 
concepts  of  labour  earnings.  We  finally  provide  the  first  estimates  of  the  EU wide  wage 
distribution in 2006 (excluding Malta, for which data are unavailable) in Section 6, together 
with a first analysis of its determinants in Section 7. We end by drawing our conclusions and 
some recommendations in Section 8. 
 
2. Earnings in the EU-SILC 
 
  Wave 2007 1 of the EU SILC users’ database, which we use throughout the paper, 
contains information on current gross monthly earnings (PY200G) for the month in which the 
interview is conducted and five different variables for the whole calendar year preceding the 
interview:
11 i) net employee cash or near cash income (PY010N); ii) gross employee cash or 
near cash income (PY010G); iii) net non cash employee income (PY020N); iv) gross non 
cash employee income (PY020G); v) employer’s social insurance contribution (PY030G) (in 
all cases, gross and net refer to taxes and social contributions deducted at source).
12 In our 
analysis,  we  concentrate  on  monetary  incomes  and  we  do  not  generally  consider  in kind 
payments (PY020N, PY020G). 
  Current gross monthly earnings are comprehensively defined as the monthly amount 
earned by an employee in the main job, including usual paid overtime, tips, commissions and a 
proportionate share of supplementary payments like the 13th month payment or an annual 
bonus. By referring to the current period, this variable may be more precisely estimated by 
respondents in surveys than variables referring to the previous year, which require them to 
remember earnings received several months earlier, although it may imperfectly represent one 
twelfth of the annual labour earnings whenever payments vary significantly from month to 
month. On the other hand, data on earnings received in the previous year may be matched and 
corrected  with  administrative  records,  when  collected  in  surveys,  and  may  be  the  only 
available information in countries relying on register data. All in all, the relative quality of the 
two variables depends on the country considered, and it is not possible to decide a priori 
which  one  is  to  be  preferred.  In  this  paper  we  do  not  further  consider  current  monthly 
earnings,  because  they  are  available  only  gross  of  taxes  and  social  contributions  for  nine 
countries (AT, EL, ES, HU, IE, IT, PL, PT, UK).
13 
  The cash income earned in the previous year refers to the monetary component of the 
compensation of employees, including wages and salaries and any other payment in cash,
14 
with  the  exception  of  reimbursements  for  business  travel,  severance,  termination  and 
                                                 
11 Two countries adopt a different income reference period: Ireland takes the twelve months immediately prior 
the date of interview; the United Kingdom takes the calendar year of the interview. There is no straightforward 
solution for the Irish data, but we could merge British data from wave T 1 with data from wave T for the other 
countries. Despite the implied inconsistency, we stick to Eurostat practice of reporting information from the 
same  wave.  In  the  estimation  of  the  EU  earnings distribution, however, we adjust nominal values for the 
increase in the harmonised index of consumer prices, between 2006 and 2007 in the United Kingdom (2.3 per 
cent) and between 2006 and the 2007 average of the twelve month moving averages of the index in Ireland 
(1.3 per cent). 
12 PY030G includes all payments made by employers for the benefits of their employees to insurers (social 
security funds and private funded schemes) covering statutory, conventional or contractual contributions, on a 
mandatory or optional basis, in respect of insurance against social risks (retirement, health, disability, etc.).  
13 In a study of the British household income distribution in the 1990s, Böheim and Jenkins (2006) find that 
current income measures and annual income measures provide, in practice, similar results. 
14 It includes holiday payments, overtime pay, fees paid to directors of incorporated enterprises, piece rate 
payments, payments for fostering children, commissions, tips and gratuities, supplementary payments like the 
13th  month  payment,  bonuses  and  performance  premia,  allowances  for  working  in  remote  locations,  and 
allowances for transport to or from work.   5 
redundancy payments, and union strike pay. It should be recorded both gross and net of the 
value of any social contributions and income taxes payable by an employee, or by the employer 
on behalf of the employee, to social insurance schemes or tax authorities. As shown in Figure 
1, which is reconstructed from the tabulation of the flag variables for PY010N and PY010G 
(Table  A1),  the  situation  is  better  than  for  current  monthly  income,  but  coverage  and 
definitions  are  not  fully  homogenous across countries. Gross earnings are available for all 
countries, but only in thirteen countries they are collected as such (AT, CY, DE, DK, FI, HU, 
IE, LU, LV, NL, SI, SK, UK); in five countries they are all calculated using the information 
collected on wages net of tax on income at source and social contributions (EL, IT, PL) or net 
of tax on social contributions (FR, SE); in the remaining six countries, they are partly collected 
and partly calculated from net earnings (BE, CZ, EE, ES, LT, PT). Net earnings are missing in 
eight countries (CY, DE, DK, FI, HU, NL, SK, UK); in fourteen countries they are available 
net of tax on income at source and social contributions, in nine of them as recorded at data 
collection (AT, BE, EL, ES, IT, LU, LV, PL, SI) and in five after estimation (CZ, EE, IE, LT, 
SE); in two countries they are available wholly (FR) or in a significant proportion (PT) net of 
tax on social contributions.
15  
 
Figure 1: Map of available net and gross employee cash or near cash income in EU SILC, 
Survey Year 2007 
    Net earnings 
   
Net of tax on income at 
source and social contri 
butions 
Net of tax on social 
contributions 










CY  DE  DK  FI 




BE10% CZ26% IT 
EE89% EL ES46% 
LT85% PL PT73% 
SE  FR  PT16%  – 
 
Notes: subscripts indicate the fraction of data with the indicated characteristics. The few cases where data at 
collection are classified as “unknown” (2.2 per cent in EE, 3.0 in LT, and 0.4 in PT) are included together 
with those classified as “gross”. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
                                                 
15 For gross and net earnings, it is also available the information on “imputation factors”, which are the ratios 
of the values collected during the interview to the values recorded in the database. These variables (PY010G_I, 
PY010N_I)  integrate  the  flag  variables  used  for  Figure  1  by  allowing  users  to  assess  the  extent  of  the 
imputation process, distinguishing partial imputation (positive factor different from 1) from full imputation 
(factor equal to 0). However, the coding of these variables is inconsistent. For net earnings, the imputation 
factor is correctly missing for the eight countries where this variable is not recorded (CY, DE, DK, FI, HU, 
NL, SK, UK), and its values suggest that virtually no imputation was applied in two countries (EL, IT), while 
it affected 10 to 25 per cent of observations in five countries (AT, BE, FR, LU, SI) and all observations in one 
country (CZ). However, in SE the fact that no observation was imputed according to PY010N_I is at odds with 
the  information  from  the  corresponding  flag  variable  that  wages  were  collected  “net  of  tax  on  social 
contributions” but were then recorded “net of tax on income at source and social contributions”: we would 
rather expect to find most values above 1. The remaining seven countries show values well above 1, which are 
implausible: they range from 20 to 21 in one case (LV), they are equal to either 2,000 or 2,100 in another (ES), 
or they are frequently or entirely above 2,000 in the others (EE, IE, LT, PL, PT). The coding problems are 
similar for gross earnings; for the countries where the comparison is possible, the occurrence of imputation 
seems to be larger than for net earnings.   6 
  As  regards  total  compensations,  employers’  social  insurance  contributions  are 
supposed  to  be  collected  since  2007,  but  they  are  not  yet available for Germany and are 
missing  in  82  per  cent  of  the  cases  in  the  United  Kingdom;  almost  4  per  cent  of  the 
observations is also missing in Belgium. Moreover, a large number of nil values is present in 
several countries: it happens for all individuals with positive gross earnings in Lithuania, and 
for 44 per cent of them in Poland, 25 per cent in France, 21 per cent in Slovenia, and between 
10 and 15 per cent in Ireland, Spain and Cyprus. Nil values are difficult to interpret for the 
user:  they  might  correspond  to  cases  where  the  employer  was  not  required  to  pay  any 
insurance  contribution,  but  they  might  also  indicate  situations where the employer evaded 
these obligations. They might also represent misclassified missing values, which appears to be 
the case for Lithuania (see below). 
  To sum up, in the EU SILC users’ database the net wage is not available for some 
countries and is not fully comparable in the others, because of the different items subtracted 
from the gross value. Comparisons of employees’ total compensations are also unfeasible, as 
employers’ social insurance contributions are virtually unavailable in two major countries and 
puzzlingly characterised by large proportions of nil values in several other countries. Gross 
earnings represent the only indicator available for all countries. 
 
3.   How does the EU-SILC compare to other sources? 
 
  At the aggregate level, national accounts constitute the primary basis for the evaluation 
of differences in the level and dynamics of wages across countries. Hence, they provide a 
natural benchmark for assessing the information collected in household surveys. In Table 1, we 
compare the grossed up EU SILC values for gross wages and salaries (PY010G+PY020G) 
and  the  compensation of employees (PY010G+PY020G+PY030G) with the corresponding 
amounts in the annual sector accounts.
16 The latter are the most comparable aggregates, as 
they refer to the amounts received by the household sector and are net of compensations paid 
to  non residents;  on  the  other  hand,  they  include  the  labour  earnings  of  people  living 
permanently in institutions (hostels, boarding houses, prisons, military installations, etc.) as 
well as of illegal immigrants, which are not covered by the EU SILC. As generally found in 
similar comparisons (e.g. Atkinson and Micklewright 1983, for the UK; Brandolini 1999, for 
Italy),  the  matching  between  the  two  sources  tends  to  be  fairly  good:  the  discrepancy  is 
around 10 per cent or less in 15 (out of 23) countries for gross wages and salaries and in 10 
(out of 20) countries for the compensation of employees. Yet, other discrepancies are more 
worrying: gross earnings appear to be between a fifth and a third lower in the EU SILC than 
in national accounts in Hungary, Ireland and France; the shortfall for the compensation of 
employees exceeds 20 per cent in the same three countries and in Lithuania and Portugal; 
conversely, Cyprus exhibits EU SILC values well above the corresponding national accounts 
aggregates. This comparison provides a useful validation exercise of the EU SILC data. First, 
it confirms that employers do pay social insurance contributions in Lithuania, so that the nil 
values in the EU SILC users’ database are actually misclassified missing values.
17 Second, it 
allows  us  to  single  out  countries  where  some  work  is  needed  to  reconcile  the  EU SILC 
evidence with the corresponding aggregate figures. Third, it warns that the picture drawn from 
                                                 
16 We include both cash and in kind earnings to match national accounts definitions. All statistics discussed in 
this and subsequent sections are calculated using personal cross sectional weights (PB040) which sum to the 
country population of household members aged 16 and over. These weights ensure that grossed up values and 
area wide aggregation are meaningful. 
17  This  is  confirmed  by  the  Euromod  country  report  for  Lithuania  (Ivaskaite Tamosiune,  Lazutka  and 
Salanauskaite 2010).   7 
the  EU SILC  may  deviate  from  that  derived  from  national  accounts:  for  instance,  France 
accounts for 16 per cent of gross earnings in national accounts, but for only 13 per cent in the 
EU SILC aggregates, while the Italian share goes up from 10 to 11 per cent.  
 
Table 1: Earnings in the EU SILC and in national accounts in 2006 (millions of euro and per 
cent) 
Country  Wages and salaries  Compensation of employees 
  EU SILC  National 
accounts 
Ratio (%)  EU SILC  National 
accounts 
Ratio (%) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]=[1]:[2]  [4]  [5]  [6]=[4]:[5] 
BE  119,793  122,499  97.8  163,457  163,944  99.7 
CZ  30,888  37,021  83.4  41,600  48,943  85.0 
DK  97,861  105,998  92.3  109,048  116,187  93.9 
DE  897,097  926,210  96.9  –  1,148,990  – 
EE  4,577  4,770  96.0  6,017  6,194  97.1 
IE  51,612  67,392  76.6  57,530  71,955  80.0 
EL  56,580  56,027  101.0  72,571  71,910  100.9 
ES  325,009  360,220  90.2  405,164  464,266  87.3 
FR  557,621  695,771  80.1  739,743  944,904  78.3 
IT  446,592  444,766  100.4  575,211  608,547  94.5 
CY  6,593  5,648  116.7  7,413  6,455  114.8 
LV  5,488  6,299  87.1  6,545  7,417  88.2 
LT  8,027  8,289  96.8  8,027  10,432  76.9 
LU  9,051  –  –  10,300  –  – 
HU  21,605  32,989  65.5  27,838  42,327  65.8 
NL  216,255  206,548  104.7  265,790  263,652  100.8 
AT  90,579  101,338  89.4  108,151  125,508  86.2 
PL  84,230  87,357  96.4  92,729  100,427  92.3 
PT  54,277  60,524  89.7  56,433  77,630  72.7 
SI  12,056  13,823  87.2  14,631  15,783  92.7 
SK  12,033  13,941  86.3  15,741  17,669  89.1 
FI  64,259  64,864  99.1  80,274  80,944  99.2 
SE  118,684  124,932  95.0  146,538  168,134  87.2 
UK  885,562  919,280  96.3  –  1,089,590  – 
Notes:  The  EU SILC  totals  include  cash  and  non cash  components  of  wages  and  salaries.  The  national 
accounts figures refer to incomes received by the household sector; those for the UK refer to 2007 instead of 
2006 in order to improve comparability with the EU SILC totals.  
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009) and Eurostat data 
[http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database,  downloaded  on  24  June 
2010]. 
 
  A second instructive exercise is to compare the tax wedge as estimated from the EU 
SILC data with that computed by Eurostat on the basis of a well established methodology 
developed  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co operation  and  Development  (e.g.  OECD 
2008). While the former relates to the actual amount of taxes and social contributions paid by 
people, the latter refers to the amount that a representative taxpayer would pay under existing 
legislation. The tax wedge on labour costs is defined by Eurostat (2010a) as the percentage 
ratio  of  the  sum  of  the  income  tax  on  gross  wage  earnings  and  the  employee’s  and  the 
employer’s social security contributions to the total compensation of the earner (excluding in 
kind  payments).  Eurostat  computes  this  indicator  only  for  single  persons without children 
earning 67 per cent of the average wage.
18 To match as closely as possible these estimates, we 
restrict the EU SILC sample to full time wage earners employed throughout the year, whose 
                                                 
18 The estimates by the OECD include other categories of employees, but do not cover the EU Member States 
that are not member of the OECD.   8 
earnings are within a ±15 per cent band around the average value utilised by Eurostat, and 
who do not have a partner, a child or a dependent co habiting relative. For the 15 countries 
where  this  computation  is  possible  (excluding  LT  for  the  reasons  given  earlier),  Figure  2 
compares the Eurostat figures in 2006 with the EU SILC medians, first quartiles and third 
quartiles. As known, there is considerable variation in the level of the tax wedge, from around 
50 per cent in Belgium to below 20 per cent in Ireland. This is consistently brought out by 
both  Eurostat  figures  and  EU SILC  medians,  which  are  highly  correlated  (the  Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 0.88). In nine countries (BE, CZ, EE, EL, ES, IE, IT, LU, SI) the 
EU SILC values are narrowly distributed around the median and close to Eurostat estimates. 
In two countries (FR, LV) the tax wedge is for a sizeable proportion of employees well below 
that calculated by Eurostat: this could signal a problem in the data, but could also follow from 
employment  subsidies  entailing  a  reduction  of  social  security  contributions.  The  EU SILC 
values appear to underestimate the Eurostat tax wedge by somewhat more than 4 percentage 













BE SE FR AT IT PL LV SI CZ EE EL ES PT LU IE
Eurostat EU-SILC
 
Notes: the tax wedge is defined as the percentage ratio of the sum of the income tax on gross wage earnings 
and the employee’s and the employer’s social security contributions to the total compensation of the employee; 
low wage earners are single persons without children earning 67 per cent of the average wage. The EU SILC 
figures refer to median values; vertical bars around the median indicate the first and third quartiles. Countries 
are ranked in descending order of the Eurostat tax wedge from left to right. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009) and Eurostat data 
[http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=earn_nt_taxwedge&lang=en, downloaded on 31 May 
2010]. 
 
  The comparisons with national accounts aggregates and with independently calculated 
tax  wedges  help  to  detect  areas  needing  further  investigation  in  the  EU SILC  data:  for 
instance,  the  French  data  are  somewhat  at  variance  with  external  sources,  whereas  social 
security contributions paid by employers appear to be substantially understated in Portugal. 
                                                 
19 Further examination of the EU SILC values reveals that cross country differences are substantial also in the 
breakdown of the tax wedge between the part paid by the employer and that paid by the employee (including 
income tax at source and social security contributions). In the whole sample, the latter is on average about a 
fifth of the total labour cost and ranges between 15 per cent (EE, ES, FR) and 26 per cent (AT, BE, PL, SE, 
SI). The range of variation is much larger for employers’ social contributions, from 10 11 per cent of the 
labour cost (IE, LU, PL) to 28 per cent (BE); it is suspiciously below 3 per cent in Portugal. The diverse 
incidence of employers’ social insurance contributions drives cross country differences in the tax wedge.   9 
Although  more  work  is  necessary  to  validate  the  data  and  to  document  legitimate 
discrepancies  from  external  sources,  overall  these  comparisons  provide  some  reassuring 
evidence on the quality of the EU SILC information on earnings. 
 
4. Time units and conversion rates 
 
  As just seen, annual (cash) gross earnings is the only variable which is available for all 
EU countries. Annual earnings are useful to study the contribution of labour income to total 
household income and, hence, to the (material) standard of living of individuals. However, 
annual earnings are an imperfect measure of the remuneration of labour as they reflect both the 
wage rate and the amount of time spent at work. The hourly or (part time adjusted) monthly 
wage may be more revealing of how the price of labour varies across countries, especially 
since European labour markets have become more flexible. 
  Full time equivalent monthly earnings can be calculated in the EU SILC by dividing 
the annual value (PY010G) by the number of months worked in full time jobs (PL070) plus 
the number of months worked in part time jobs (PL071) scaled down by a country sex specific 
factor equal to the ratio of median hours of work (PL060) in part time jobs to median hours of 
work  in  full time  jobs  (PL030).  Here,  we  consider  both  annual  and  monthly  earnings but 
restrict our attention to employees who report positive values for either of them. This implies 
that our sample is larger for annual wages, as monthly wages cannot be calculated where the 
number of months spent in part time work or in full time work is missing. Unfortunately, the 
difference between the two samples is significant, as overall 9 per cent of the observations is 
lost for the EU. More disturbingly, the pattern varies considerably across countries, with lost 
observations rising from 1 per cent (EL, ES, LT, LU, PT) to around 20 per cent (DK, SI). 
The overwhelming majority of these cases corresponds to observations where both the number 
of months worked in full time jobs and the number of months worked in part time jobs are 
coded as zero. It is conceivable that gross earnings are positive while no or limited work was 
made  (e.g.  arrears,  very  short  temporary  contracts),
20  but the joint occurrence of positive 
earnings and no month spent in work is suspiciously frequent: it concerns, for instance, 11 13 
per cent of cases in Finland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
We do not make any adjustment for this difference in the sample, but it should be borne in 
mind that it is bound to affect the observed discrepancies between annual and monthly values. 
  In the EU SILC, earnings are expressed, as all other income variables, in euro. For the 
14  countries  which  were  not  part  of  the  monetary  union  in  2006,  the values collected in 
national currency are converted into euro at the average market exchange rates. These rates 
are influenced by many factors, such as the flows of international trade or speculative capital 
movements, and need not reflect the price structures that prevail in the various countries. In 
poorer  countries  labour intensive  non tradable  services  are typically cheaper than in richer 
countries: since market exchange rates are unlikely to account for these price differences, their 
use  would  lead  to  understate  real incomes in poorer countries. Purchasing Power Parities 
(PPP) obviate these problems by providing the relative values, in national currencies, of a fixed 
bundle  of  goods  and  services.  As  a  consequence,  PPP  not  only  convert  all  values  into  a 
common standard (denominated Purchasing Power Standard, PPS, in Eurostat statistics) but 
also adjust them for differences in price levels across countries. 
  For European countries, annual PPP indices are available for gross domestic product 
(GDP) and for a number of expenditure components of GDP (Eurostat and Organisation for 
                                                 
20 A month is considered as spent at work if the respondent worked for two or more weeks.   10 
Economic  Co operation  and  Development  2006).  The  choice  of  the  index  matters.
21  By 
deflating  nominal  wages  by  the  PPP  index  for  household  final  consumption  expenditure 
(HFCE) rather than the PPP index for GDP, in 2006 real wages are 5 to 8 per cent lower in 
Poland,  Latvia,  Estonia,  Lithuania,  Slovakia,  and  Finland,  but  2  to  3  per  cent  higher  in 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Austria (in either case the PPP 
index is normalised to 1 for the EU 27). As these differences are positively correlated with the 
level of GDP per capita in PPS (Figure 3), the use of the PPP index for GDP tends to narrow 
international differences in real wages relative to the PPP index for HFCE. The PPP HFCE 
index  (applied  to  net  earnings)  is  preferable  to  derive  the  EU  distribution  of  “consumer” 
wages, as it measures purchasing power in terms of consumption goods and services, but the 
PPP GDP index (applied to total compensations) is more appropriate to study the distribution 
of “producer” wages, as it refers to the whole value added. Note that the PPP GDP index is 
generally applied to derive all national accounts variables expressed in PPS.  
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Notes: The real wage change is the one that obtains by replacing the PPP index for GDP by the PPP index for 
HFCE in the wage deflation. Luxembourg is not included because of its extreme value of GDP per capita 
(272.1). 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/purchasing_ 
power_parities/introduction, downloaded on 3 June 2010].  
 
5. Earnings distributions in EU countries 
 
  The distribution of real monthly full time equivalent gross earnings in 2006 in all EU 
25  member  countries  (except  for  Malta)  is  shown  in  Figure  4.  Gross  earnings  are  here 
expressed in thousands of PPS using the PPP index for HFCE. The graph shows for each 
country the median value (the thick horizontal mark), the distance between the 20th and the 
80th percentiles (the vertical box), and the 5th and 95th percentiles (the two extremes of the 
thin vertical bar). Countries are ranked in ascending order of median earnings from left to 
right. As expected, Eastern European nations precede Southern European countries and then 
the  remaining  EU  countries,  which  are  rather  close  to  each  other  except  for  the  outlier 
Luxembourg. Earnings differences are sizeable, both across and within countries. The Slovak 
                                                 
21 A further problem, especially in analyses at the global level, is posed by the multiplicity of PPP indices 
differing by source and method. See Brandolini (2007) and Anand and Segal (2008) for a discussion.   11 
median is only 18 per cent of the Luxembourger median, a gap that widens to 23 per cent if 
the comparison is made at the 5th percentile. For almost 80 per cent of Eastern Europeans 
labour  incomes  are  below  or  at  most  comparable  to  those  of  the  poorest  20  per  cent  of 
Europeans living in the richer Central and Nordic countries.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of real monthly full time equivalent gross earnings in EU countries in 
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Notes: Boxes span 20th to 80th percentiles; vertical bars span 5th to 95th percentile; light horizontal lines are 
median  earnings;  thick  horizontal  lines  are  average  earnings.  Countries  are  ranked  in ascending order of 
median earnings from left to right. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
 
  The variable lengths of the vertical bars reveal some noticeable differences in within 
country  earnings  dispersion,  such  as  that  between  Belgium  or  Denmark  and  the  United 
Kingdom, three countries which share similar median values. On the other hand, there are 
unexpected similarities among countries as different as France, Finland and Italy, which exhibit 
remarkably close values of the mean, the median, and the 20th and 80th percentiles. It should 
be  noted  that  these  bars  show  absolute  and  not  relative  differences.  If  percentiles  were 
expressed  as  percentages  of  national  medians,  as  customary  in  cross national  inequality 
comparisons, earnings differences in Eastern Europe would not look so small compared to 
those in the EU 15. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, Latvia and Lithuania would exhibit, together 
with  Luxembourg,  the  second  largest  value  of  the  quintile  ratio  (the  ratio  of  the  80th 
percentile to the 20th percentile) after Germany. This country ranking is partly surprising. It is 
somewhat  unusual  to  observe  the  highest  values of the decile ratio (the ratio of the 90th 
percentile  to  the  10th  percentile)  in  Germany  and Sweden, and much lower values in the 
United Kingdom and especially Italy. This ordering is the opposite of the one that is usually 
found for household equivalent incomes (e.g. Wolff, 2010). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to study the factors that help to explain such a difference (e.g. employment rates, other 
sources of income, welfare unit; see Atkinson and Brandolini 2007). Here, suffice it to say that 
comparing the EU SILC with the SES results provides reassuring evidence. The correlation of   12 
Table 2: Statistics for the distribution of gross earnings in EU countries in 2006 
Country  Sample 
size 



















  Monthly full-time equivalent gross earnings 
BE  5,648  3,862  2,848  2,560  2,644  2,377 0.255  1.9  2.9 
CZ  8,979  4,043  654  576  1,066  939  0.279  2.2  3.2 
DK  6,945  2,319  3,573  3,339  2,582  2,413 0.243  1.8  2.8 
DE  12,288  33,385  2,525  2,381  2,461  2,320 0.346  3.3  6.8 
EE  6,493  651  613  472  895  689  0.353  2.8  4.8 
IE  4,593  1,677  3,025  2,462  2,430  1,977 0.357  2.7  5.1 
EL  3,725  3,059  1,657  1,331  1,862  1,496 0.337  2.5  4.1 
ES  12,959  18,255  1,648  1,400  1,795  1,525 0.313  2.4  4.1 
FR  10,159  23,760  2,171  1,853  2,001  1,708 0.296  2.1  3.5 
IT  15,867  18,199  2,140  1,826  2,054  1,752 0.307  2.2  3.6 
CY  4,146  327  1,779  1,469  2,004  1,654 0.340  2.6  4.4 
LV  4,690  1,020  460  379  757  623  0.367  3.0  5.4 
LT  5,254  1,483  483  388  842  676  0.359  3.0  5.0 
LU  4,533  200  4,176  3,480  3,752  3,127 0.344  3.0  4.9 
HU  8,155  3,782  507  408  836  673  0.329  2.5  3.7 
NL  11,584  6,748  3,421  2,810  3,289  2,702 0.364  2.4  4.6 
AT  6,776  3,467  2,495  2,171  2,449  2,131 0.327  2.4  4.9 
PL  12,625  13,262  573  447  917  716  0.354  2.7  4.5 
PT  4,087  4,024  1,183  793  1,394  934  0.414  2.9  5.3 
SI  11,836  786  1,314  1,093  1,713  1,424 0.325  2.4  3.9 
SK  6,174  2,247  446  403  623  562  0.260  2.0  3.1 
FI  12,409  2,447  2,505  2,219  2,042  1,809 0.301  2.1  3.9 
SE  8,988  4,395  2,494  2,298  2,106  1,940 0.336  2.5  6.2 
UK  7,912  22,720  3,259  2,581  2,947  2,334 0.365  2.7  4.6 
  Yearly gross earnings 
BE  5,877  4,022  29,159  27,278  27,074  25,327 0.319  2.4  5.8 
CZ  9,283  4,179  7,252  6,605  11,825  10,770 0.326  2.5  5.2 
DK  8,497  2,899  33,549  34,246  24,246  24,750 0.361  4.3  14.5 
DE  13,241  36,067  24,611  22,328  23,987  21,762 0.424  6.5  15.3 
EE  6,691  666  6,692  5,369  9,767  7,836 0.392  3.2  6.3 
IE  4,836  1,790  28,286  22,665  22,720  18,204 0.460  5.9  19.9 
EL  3,764  3,092  18,197  14,493  20,446  16,284 0.384  3.2  6.8 
ES  13,146  18,524  17,311  15,220  18,857  16,580 0.365  3.2  7.7 
FR  10,925  25,497  21,851  19,682  20,139  18,140 0.364  3.0  8.1 
IT  18,072  20,524  21,442  19,419  20,578  18,636 0.381  3.4  10.7 
CY  4,340  341  19,248  16,121  21,675  18,154 0.403  3.5  10.5 
LV  5,305  1,131  4,813  3,812  7,922  6,275 0.427  4.0  11.7 
LT  5,290  1,493  5,346  4,210  9,322  7,341 0.395  3.4  6.7 
LU  4,563  202  44,366  35,100  39,861  31,536 0.392  3.4  7.1 
HU  8,710  4,027  5,337  4,371  8,801  7,208 0.393  3.0  8.3 
NL  13,263  7,934  27,257  24,069  26,209  23,143 0.440  5.8  21.2 
AT  7,012  3,589  25,235  22,376  24,765  21,959 0.392  3.7  10.4 
PL  13,708  13,288  6,258  5,013  10,020  8,028 0.400  3.2  7.7 
PT  4,112  4,050  13,266  9,070  15,625  10,684 0.439  3.0  7.0 
SI  15,039  970  12,367  10,825  16,124  14,113 0.430  5.4  22.4 
SK  6,685  2,426  4,734  4,351  6,602  6,068 0.328  2.4  6.6 
FI  13,901  2,691  23,574  22,758  19,213  18,548 0.414  5.7  24.3 
SE  10,211  4,975  23,525  23,526  19,860  19,861 0.396  5.1  24.6 
UK  8,979  25,874  32,929  26,332  29,773  23,808 0.393  3.1  7.1 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
 
the  decile  ratios  for  monthly  full time  equivalent  gross  earnings  in  Table  2  with  the 
corresponding SES figures reported by Casali and Alvarez Gonzalez (2010, page 4, Table 2) 
is positive but moderate (correlation coefficient equal to 0.42), also for the impact of two 
outliers, Germany and Sweden (left panel of Figure 5); when the EU SILC sample is restricted 
to  full time  workers  employed  throughout  the  year,  in  order  to  better  match  the  SES   13 
definition, the relationship becomes much stronger (correlation coefficient equal to 0.84) (right 
panel of Figure 5). This confirms that the spreading of temporary occupations and jobs lasting 
for less than the whole year has a considerable impact on measured wage inequality, as also 
shown by the much higher dispersion of annual earnings relative to that of monthly full time 
equivalent earnings (compare the top and bottom panels in Table 2).  
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Notes: The SES figures are for the annual earnings of full time employees in the sectors covered by the survey; 
the EU SILC figures are for monthly full time equivalent gross earnings of all employees in the left panel and 
of full time workers employed throughout the year in the right panel. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009) and SES data drawn 
from Casali and Alvarez Gonzalez (2010, page 4, Table 2). 
 
  Before examining the EU wide distribution, it is useful to assess the importance of the 
earnings definition. The three panels of Figure 6 report the median, the decile ratio and the 
Gini index for the distributions of net earnings, gross earnings and total compensations in the 
14 countries where all three variables are available. (Lithuania and Portugal are not included 
for the reasons discussed above.) All three variables are expressed on a monthly basis after 
adjusting for part time and are deflated by the PPP index for HFCE; the sample is restricted to 
observations that have a positive value for all definitions. Countries are ranked in ascending 
order of median net earnings. The absolute gap between net and gross earnings tends to widen 
as countries become richer, with the exception of Ireland. Latvia and Poland together with 
Ireland  and  Luxembourg  show  narrow  differences  between  gross  earnings  and  total 
compensations, whereas Belgium stands out for the largest difference. In all countries but 
France,  Latvia,  Poland and Spain, dispersion decreases substantially considering net rather 
than gross earnings, as a consequence of the progressive structure of labour income taxation. 
Conversely, there is little difference, on average, between the dispersion of the labour cost and 
that of gross earnings. This follows from the fact that the difference is generally small and in 
either direction, as employers’ social security contributions tend to be roughly proportional 
and sometimes mildly regressive (especially in Spain, apparently).
22  
                                                 
22 For the same reason, estimates of the average returns to education are barely affected by the choice between 
gross earnings or total compensation, whereas more substantial changes are observed if net instead of gross 
earnings are used. Labour income taxation affects country ranking: for instance, France moves from the 12th 
   14 
Figure 6: Distribution of real monthly full time equivalent earnings in selected EU countries by 




































Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
 
  Taking the 14 countries as a whole, median net earnings are 69 per cent of median 
gross earnings, and 62 per cent of median labour cost. The Gini index falls slightly from 0.354 
for total compensations to 0.350 for gross earnings, and more significantly to 0.330 for net 
earnings.  A  similar  picture  is  provided  by  the  mean  logarithmic  deviation  which  has  the 
                                                                                                                                                     
to the 9th position looking at the returns to tertiary education for male full time workers if net instead of gross 
earnings are used.   15 
advantage of being decomposable into a between  and a within country component. The fall in 
dispersion  from  gross  to  net  earnings  is  entirely  due  to  a  decline  in  the  within country 
component: the progressivity of income taxes and employees’ social contributions reduces the 
degree  of  inequality  in  each  country  without  affecting  their  relative  rankings.  The  fall  in 
dispersion  from  total  compensations  to  gross  earnings  is  instead  driven  by  the  between 
country  component,  following  from  the  high cross country variability of employers’ social 
security contributions levied at approximately proportional rates. This evidence confirms that 
the  earnings  definition  may  affect the comparison of national distributions and, hence, the 
construction  of  area wide  statistics.  Gross  earnings  are  the  only  measure  available  for  all 
countries in the EU SILC users’ database, but are possibly the least suited, as they do not 
account  for  the  different  structure  of  income  taxes  across  countries  and  depend  on  the 
composition of social contributions.
23  
 
6. The EU-wide distribution of gross earnings 
 
  Statistics for the distribution of monthly (full time equivalent) and annual earnings for 
both  the  euro  area  and  the  EU 25  taken  as  a  whole  are  reported  in  Table  3.  Since  the 
conversion factor affects mean country earnings and thus distributive measures for groups of 
countries, Table 3 contains statistics based on market exchange rates as well as the two PPP 
indices  for  GDP  and  HFCE.  Using  unadjusted  figures  parallels  the  standard  practice  in 
national reports of ignoring territorial differences in price levels, a sensible exercise particularly 
in the analysis of the wage distribution in the monetary union.
24  
  In the euro area, the average employee earns 2,263 euro per month, gross of taxes and 
social contributions and after adjusting for part time, while the median employee earns 15 per 
cent less, or 1,918 euro per month. These values fall by 5 and 7 per cent to 2,153 and 1,786 
euro per month, respectively, when the whole EU 25 is considered. Inequality is always higher 
when earnings are measured in euros at market rates than in PPS with either index; it is always 
lower if earnings are converted using the PPP index for GDP (but differences are generally 
small,  especially  in  the  euro  area).  The  much  greater  dispersion  observed  for annual than 
monthly  earnings  indicate  that  labour  supply  does  not  offset  lower  wage  rates.  Lastly, 
inequality  is  larger  when  measured  for  the  EU 25  than  for  the  euro  area,  which  is  not 
surprising given that the latter does not include the poorer Eastern European countries that 
joined the Union in 2004.  
  The distribution of earnings in the euro area and in the EU 25 can be traced back to 
the distribution of the observable characteristics of the underlying populations. By denoting by 
                                                 
23 Thus, nations with similar levels of labour cost will show different average gross earnings depending on the 
share of contributions paid by the employee. In some countries, like France, contributions paid by employers 
are the largest component of the total tax wedge, but in other countries they account for a smaller fraction and 
the difference between gross earnings and labour cost is narrow. Similar considerations would apply to in kind 
payments, which are not considered here. 
24 It is, however, potentially inconsistent to correct only for cost of living differences across nations, while 
ignoring those across geographical areas within the same nation. This would be justifiable if the latter were 
less  important  than  the  former,  but  little  is  known  due  to  the  lack  of  reliable  territorial  price  indices. 
Accounting  for  within country  territorial  differences  is  likely to affect results considerably. Moretti (2008) 
recently estimated that half of the observed increase in the returns to college in the United States between 1980 
and 2000 disappears when the college premium is measured in real terms, by deflating nominal wages by a 
price index that allows for differences in the cost of housing across metropolitan areas. In more general terms, 
the question is whether we should use group specific price indices to transform nominal wages into real wages. 
A discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.   16 
yjc the (natural logarithm of) earnings of person j in country c, the overall variance can be 
decomposed as follows: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ - + s = - = c EU c c c c c c j EU jc jc y y n n y y
N
y Var
2 2 ) ( ) (
1
) ( , 
where nc is the share of EU population in country c, sc is the variance in country c, and yc and 
yEU are the average earnings of country c and the EU as a whole, respectively
25. The first term 
on the right hand side is the within country component of the total variance while the second 
term is the between country component. These components can be linked to the observable 
(X) and unobservable (u) individual characteristics by assuming that (log) earnings are a linear 
function of them, or  jc c jc jc u b X y + = . 
 
Table 3: Statistics for the EU wide distribution of gross earnings in 2006 
Gross earnings definition  Sample size No. of em 
ployees 
(000) 
Mean   Median  Gini   index  Quintile 
ratio 
Decile  ratio 
  Euro area 
Monthly full-time equivalent 
 PPS HFCE  104,628  119,083  2,199  1,857 0.343  2.7  5.0 
 PPS GDP  104,628  119,083  2,200  1,860 0.342  2.7  4.9 
 Euro at market rates  104,628  119,083  2,263  1,918 0.349  2.8  5.3 
Yearly               
 PPS HFCE  112,712  127,982  21,745  18,722 0.405  4.2  11.7 
 PPS GDP  112,712  127,982  21,760  18,736 0.404  4.1  11.7 
 Euro at market rates  112,712  127,982  22,368  19,246 0.409  4.3  11.8 
  EU 25 
Monthly full-time equivalent 
 PPS HFCE  196,825  176,118  2,099  1,732 0.381  3.3  6.5 
 PPS GDP  196,825  176,118  2,099  1,734 0.377  3.2  6.3 
 Euro at market rates  196,825  176,118  2,153  1,786 0.410  4.1  9.2 
Yearly               
 PPS HFCE  215,450  190,252  21,071  17,443 0.428  4.6  11.7 
 PPS GDP  215,450  190,252  21,072  17,510 0.425  4.5  11.5 
 Euro at market rates  215,450  190,252  21,613  17,684 0.453  5.9  14.4 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
 
  Country differences may stem from differences in the characteristics of workers (such 
as education) and differences in the way these characteristics are valued in the labour market 
(returns). To disentangle these two factors we make use of the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973), which allows us to decompose the term  ) ( EU c y y -  into a part 
explained by population differences between country c and the whole EU and a part due to 
differences in returns to specific individual attributes:  
) ( ) ( ) ( c EU c EU EU c EU EU c c EU c b b X b X X b X b X y y - + - = - = - . 
Since this decomposition applies to the difference in means, while we are interested in the 
effects  of  these  two  components  on  the  between country  variance,  we  compute 
∑ - = c EU EU c c b X X n CBV
2 ] ) [( .  CBV  can  be  interpreted  as  the  counterfactual  between 
                                                 
25 For analytical convenience and comparability with the literature in labour economics, we focus here on the 
variance of logarithms, though it is not a proper inequality measure due to its violation of the Pigou Dalton 
transfer principle (Foster and Ok, 1999).   17 
country variance that would arise if all countries displayed the same EU wide returns to given 
observable attributes (i.e. the same wage schedule). As our calculations below include a set of 
dummy variables for the interaction of sex, education, age and birth in the survey country, the 
above quantity can also be seen as the pure effect of country composition on between country 
differences.
26  Within country  variance  sc  reflects  both  the  heterogeneity  of  the  underlying 
population,  ) ( jc X Var ,  and  the  returns  to  unobservable  characteristics.  We  compute  the 
explained within country variance as  ) ( c jcb X Var , where bc is the OLS estimate of the vector 
of parameters of the country wage equation. The residual is the unexplained component. 
 
Table 4: Variance decomposition of the logarithm of monthly full time equivalent earnings in 
2006 (absolute values and percentage shares in italics) 
Total  Between countries  Within countries  Gross earnings             unit 
of account 
  Actual  Counter 
factual 
Total  Explained  Unexplained 
  [1]=[2]+[4]  [2]  [3]  [4]=[5]+[6]  [5]  [6] 
  Euro area 
PPS HFCE  0.498  0.029  0.004  0.469  0.116  0.353 
  100.0  5.9  0.8  94.1  23.3  70.9 
Euro at market rates  0.517  0.049  0.005  0.469  0.116  0.353 
  100.0  9.4  0.9  90.6  22.4  68.2 
  EU 25 
PPS HFCE  0.611  0.147  0.002  0.463  0.107  0.357 
  100.0  24.1  0.3  75.9  17.5  58.4 
Euro at market rates  0.789  0.326  0.002  0.463  0.107  0.357 
  100.0  41.3  0.3  58.7  13.5  45.2 
Notes: The total variance in column [1] is equal to the sum of the between countries component in column [2] 
and the within countries component in column [4]; the latter component is decomposed into the part explained 
by  observable  characteristics  in  column  [5]  and  the  residual  unexplained  part  in  column  [6].  The 
counterfactual between countries variance in column [3] is obtained by imposing the same EU wide returns to 
given observable attributes in all countries. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
 
  Table 4 shows the results of this decomposition for the distribution among employees 
aged 20 64 of the logarithm of monthly full time equivalent gross earnings, both in euro and 
PPS HFCE, in the euro area and the EU 25. The earnings equation includes a dummy for birth 
in  survey  country  (PB210=LOC),  two  dummies  for  education  (High  School,  if  PE040=3; 
College, if PE040=4,5), with “at most ISCED3” (PE040=1,2,3) as the residual category, and 
nine age classes (20 24, 25 29, 30 34, 35 39, 40 44, 45 49, 50 54, 55 59, 60 64). Column [1] 
of Table 4 reports the total variance, which is the sum of the between countries component, in 
column  [2],  and  the  within countries  component,  in  column  [4];  the  latter  is  in  turn 
decomposed  into  the  part  explained  by  observable  characteristics,  in  column  [5],  and  the 
residual  unexplained  part,  in  column  [6].  Differences  across  countries  in  average  monthly 
earnings explain a small part, less than a tenth, of total dispersion in the euro area, but are 
much more important in the EU 25 (24 per cent with PPS HFCE, 41 per cent with euro). 
Conversely,  the  within country  component  accounts  for  more  than  90  per  cent  of  total 
variance in the euro area, but for only 59 (euro) or 76 (PPS HFCE) per cent in the EU 25: in 
                                                 
26  We  do  not  include  occupation  among  the  characteristics  of  interest.  Williams  (2010)  explores  the 
relationship between occupation and education and develops measures of occupational skill intensity to study 
the skill composition of employment.   18 
both areas, however, no more than a quarter of the within country component is attributable 
to observable characteristics, the rest being unexplained by the empirical model. Lastly, the 
counterfactual between country variance, reported in column [3], is virtually nil in all cases, 
suggesting that the between country component is essentially due to heterogeneous returns to 
individual attributes rather than to a different demographic composition of employees.
27 
 
7. A first look into the determinants of the EU-wide distribution of gross earnings 
 
  The previous decomposition is silent about the extent to which the variance of (log) 
earnings hinges on the distribution of each characteristic. For example, would the variance 
increase or decrease, should the educational composition of the workforce change, holding all 
else constant? In order to address this question, we apply here the regression based method 
recently developed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), which allows us to isolate the effect 
of each characteristic on the variance more straightforwardly than the alternative procedures 
devised by Machado and Mata (2005) and Melly (2006).  
  Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s method replaces the dependent variable of interest (in our 
case, log earnings) with the recentered influence function (RIF) for the distributional statistic 
of interest (in our case, the variance). The influence function (IF), a widely used and easy to 
compute concept in robust statistics, measures the robustness of a given functional g of a 
specific distribution F,  ) (F g , to outlier data and is defined by: 
e F g F g F g y IF e e / )] ( ) ( [ lim ) , ; ( 0 - = ® , 
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The recentered influence function is simply obtained by adding the statistic of interest to IF, 
) , ; ( ) ( ) , ; ( F g y IF F g F g y RIF + = , and is obviously defined for each available observation. It 
can be shown that  ∫ = 0 ) ( ) , ; ( y dF F g y IF , which implies  ∫ = ) ( ) ( ) , ; ( F g y dF F g y RIF . The 
main  contribution  of  Firpo,  Fortin  and  Lemieux  (2009)  is  to  show  that  the  effect  on  the 
statistic of interest of a small location shift in the distribution of a specific covariate, all else 
constant, can be obtained by estimation by standard methods of the relevant RIF. 
  This method can be applied to any statistic for which a RIF can be computed: here, we 
consider the variance and the main percentiles. We focus, as before, on gross monthly earnings 
in PPS HFCE of employees aged 20 to 64, but we restrict the attention to full time employees 
in order to obtain more robust estimates. As a term of comparison, we report results also for 
Germany, the largest EU economy, in addition to those for the euro area and the EU 25 taken 
as a whole. The results in Table 5 and Figure 7 show the effects on the distribution of (log) 
earnings of a small change in the composition of the workforce by sex, birth in the survey 
country, education and age.
28 (To facilitate comparisons of the effects of different covariates, 
the same scale is used for the vertical axis in each panel of Figure 7.) Unlike those obtained 
from  standard  conditional  quantile  regressions,  these  effects  represent  the  change  in  the 
unconditional distribution associated with a change in the characteristic of interest. Thus, the 
fact that the effect of high school in Germany is larger at the 10th than at the 90th percentile 
                                                 
27 The same conclusion is reached by Behr and Pötter (2010) for EU 15 countries using ECHP data. 
28 The same model estimated with country dummies yields similar results.   19 
implies that its overall effect is to reduce inequality, as measured by the difference between 
these  two  percentiles.  In  a  standard  conditional  quantile  regression  this  conclusion  would 
apply only to employees sharing the same values of the other covariates; in the case of the 
unconditional quantile regressions underlying the results of Table 5, the conclusion is more 
general  as  the  estimation  accounts  also  for  the  effect  of  high  school  achievement  across 
groups.  
 
Table  5:  Determinants  of  the  distribution  of  the  logarithm  of  real  monthly  gross  earnings 
among full time employees aged 20 to 64 in Germany, the euro area and the EU 25 in 2006 


















  Germany 
Female  0.016   0.237**   0.270**   0.213**   0.175**   0.152**   0.166**   0.170**   0.183**   0.254** 
  (0.023)  (0.056)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
Birth in country  0.107**   0.201  0.085  0.083  0.089*  0.058  0.001  0.007  0.016   0.008 
  (0.036)  (0.129)  (0.077)  (0.055)  (0.040)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.049) 
Aged 20 34  0.416**   1.372**   0.722**   0.528**   0.397**   0.310**   0.252**   0.222**   0.194**   0.197** 
  (0.025)  (0.069)  (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.020) 
Aged 50 64  0.027  0.062   0.039   0.013  0.026  0.028  0.031*  0.060**  0.084**  0.121** 
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.028) 
High school    0.665**  1.368**  0.664**  0.404**  0.282**  0.207**  0.145**  0.094**  0.077**  0.052* 
  (0.037)  (0.135)  (0.068)  (0.047)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.023) 
College   0.605**  1.688**  0.971**  0.725**  0.595**  0.519**  0.472**  0.466**  0.469**  0.529** 
  (0.038)  (0.136)  (0.067)  (0.047)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.031) 
  Euro area 
Female   0.023*   0.328**   0.253**   0.219**   0.229**   0.235**   0.243**   0.259**   0.253**   0.292** 
  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Birth in country   0.061**  0.071*  0.116**  0.119**  0.119**  0.107**  0.092**  0.055**  0.025  0.009 
  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Aged 20 34  0.029*   0.479**   0.352**   0.318**   0.328**   0.345**   0.339**   0.329**   0.283**   0.297** 
  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
Aged 50 64  0.068**  0.079**  0.079**  0.068**  0.090**  0.105**  0.132**  0.145**  0.144**  0.161** 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.015) 
High school    0.140**  0.565**  0.393**  0.343**  0.349**  0.356**  0.327**  0.286**  0.210**  0.174** 
  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
College   0.006  0.783**  0.585**  0.548**  0.596**  0.647**  0.657**  0.667**  0.612**  0.671** 
  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
  EU 25 
Female   0.007   0.375**   0.379**   0.315**   0.275**   0.285**   0.278**   0.286**   0.268**   0.298** 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Birth in country  0.000   0.182**   0.177**   0.062**  0.003  0.007  0.023  0.007   0.028   0.054* 
  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Aged 20 34   0.007   0.345**   0.400**   0.344**   0.319**   0.329**   0.329**   0.322**   0.283**   0.286** 
  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Aged 50 64  0.069**  0.000  0.016  0.042**  0.049**  0.064**  0.076**  0.093**  0.080**  0.085** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
High school   0.066**   0.010  0.077**  0.161**  0.228**  0.269**  0.269**  0.265**  0.215**  0.189** 
  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
College  0.137**  0.436**  0.546**  0.526**  0.556**  0.627**  0.651**  0.687**  0.638**  0.681** 
  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; significance ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. There are 8,436 observations for 
Germany, 80,574 for the euro area, and 161,617 for the EU 25. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
 
  In all three areas, an increase in the share of female full time employees would lead to a 
statistically significant reduction of all percentiles, which confirms the existence of a gender 
wage gap. The change would be however similarly spread across the entire distribution, and 
the effect on the overall inequality would be negligible (mildly significant only in the euro   20 
area). The objective of raising female labour participation in the EU need not bring about a 
more unequal wage dispersion.  
 
Figure 7: Determinants of the distribution of the logarithm of real monthly gross earnings 












































































































































































Germany Euro area EU-25  
Notes: effects are shown for all 19 vingtiles. There are 8,436 observations for Germany, 80,574 for the euro 
area, and 161,617 for the EU 25. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007 1, March 2009). 
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  On the contrary, results for the effect of being born in the survey country are mixed. 
An increase in the proportion of native born employees would increase the overall variance in 
Germany, would reduce it in the euro area, and would have no effect in the EU 25. The 
German result is driven by a strong, and difficult to explain, deterioration at the bottom of the 
distribution (see top right panel in Figure 7), which dominates an otherwise flat profile. In the 
euro  area,  a  larger  share  of  native  employees  would  instead  thicken  the  middle  of  the 
distribution:  the  effects  are small but statistically significant. In the EU 25, there are little 
action in the middle and a worsening of the bottom and very top percentiles, which offset each 
other. These results are not easy to interpret, but suggest that an increase of cross country 
mobility might increase wage inequality in the euro area, and possibly in the EU 25, as mobile 
workers polarise at the bottom and the top of the earnings distribution. 
To assess the effects of population ageing, we partition employees in three groups: the 
young, or those aged 20 to 34, those aged 35 to 49, and the old, aged 50 to 64. The age 
effects are rather consistent across the three areas: an increase in the proportion of employees 
younger than 35 would reduce all percentiles, while a rise in the share of the older employees 
would tend to increase all percentiles (somewhat less in Germany). The earnings gap of the 
young appears to be strong in Germany, and the steep percentile profile shown in Figure 7 
implies that the overall variance would significantly go up should their proportion increase. 
The effect is far smaller in the euro area and the EU 25, where it would rather be a greater 
presence of older employees to widen the distribution. All in all, these results indicate that, by 
itself, ageing is likely to make the European earnings distribution more unequal. 
  The  greatest  effects  are  associated  with  education,  but  in  very  different  ways.  In 
Germany, a rise in the share of more educated people increases all percentiles, but far more 
intensively at the bottom: there is a clear egalitarian impact, as measured by the variance or the 
difference between the 90th and the 10th percentiles. Effects are stronger for college than for 
high school. The opposite results are found for the EU 25: raising the average educational 
level has a greater positive influence at the top than at the bottom of the earnings distribution 
and  increases  the  overall  variance.  The  evidence  for  euro  area  falls  between  these  two 
extremes. As for ageing, improving the educational level of the employees might lead to higher 
earnings inequality for the EU as a whole. On the other hand, the contrasting results found for 





  In the EU SILC users’ database, net earnings are missing in some countries and not 
fully comparable in the others, because of differences in the items subtracted from the gross 
value.  Comparisons  of  the  labour  cost  are  limited  because  employers’  social  insurance 
contributions are unavailable in two major countries and puzzlingly characterised by many nil 
values in several other countries. Gross earnings represent the only indicator available for all 
countries. Although the study of the wage distribution for the EU as a whole is not possible 
for  all  three  definitions,  the  available  information  makes  the  EU SILC  users’  database  a 
valuable source for comparative analysis of the structure of the labour cost and of the tax 
wedge.  
  Three developments seem worth pursuing. First, data comparability needs to be further 
improved by using more homogeneous definitions on the items deducted from gross earnings 
to obtain net earnings. The definition of French net earnings appears to be particularly out of 
line. Second, as a conspicuous number of variables are calculated from other variables (e.g. 
net from gross earnings, or vice versa), it would be important to provide details about the 
estimation procedures, for instance by specifying whether the imputation was carried out by a   22 
tax benefit  simulation  model  or  some  statistical  matching  technique.  This  would  also  be 
important to assess the fraction of wages and salaries that may be hidden to tax and social 
security authorities. Third, to facilitate a proper use of the data, the available basic description 
of the variables could be integrated with additional summary documentation on institutional 
features that would help the user to realise which data may be more problematic. 
  Our results for the distribution of full time equivalent monthly gross earnings show the 
expected  ranking  of  countries  by  the  median  value,  with Eastern European nations at the 
bottom and Luxembourg at the top. Earnings differences are sizeable, both across and within 
countries. Taking the euro area and the EU 25 as a whole, inequality is higher when earnings 
are measured in euro at market rates rather than using a PPP index, and using the PPP index 
for HFCE than that for GDP. Inequality is higher when measured for the EU 25 than for the 
euro area, which is not surprising given that the former includes the poorer Eastern European 
countries that joined the Union in 2004. Indeed, the decomposition exercise shows that the 
higher  inequality  observed  in  the  EU 25  is  largely  attributable  to  the  between country 
component. This in turns is essentially due to the returns to individual attributes rather than to 
a different composition of the employees with respect to these attributes. This suggests that 
monitoring  the  evolution  of  these  returns  may  provide  useful  insights  on  the  process  of 
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Table A1: Alternative definitions of employee cash or near cash income in EU SILC, Survey Year 2007 (per cent) 
Country  Net employee cash or near cash income (PY010N)  Gross employee cash or near cash income (PY010G)  Employer’s social insurance contri 
butions (PY030G) (1) 
Variable for 
which data are 
collected 
Net of tax 





Net of tax on social 
contributions 










Gross  Unknown  Positive 
value 








Net of tax 





Net of tax 









Net of tax 









Net of tax 









               
BE  99.9  –  –  0.1  –  –  –  10.0  –  90.0  –  94.8  1.4  3.8  5,877 
CZ  26.0  –  –  74.0  –  –  –  26.0  –  74.0  –  98.7  1.3  –  9,283 
DK  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  93.6  6.4  –  8,497 
DE  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  –  –  100.0  13,241 
EE  88.9  –  –  8.9  –  2.2  –  88.9  –  8.9  2.2  96.3  3.7  –  6,691 
IE  50.9  –  –  49.1  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  87.3  12.7  –  4,836 
EL  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  –  –  95.6  4.4  –  3,764 
ES  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  45.7  –  54.3  –  84.7  15.3  –  13,146 
FR  –  –  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  –  75.0  25.0  –  10,925 
IT  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  –  –  93.6  6.4  –  18,072 
CY  2.1  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  89.4  10.6  –  4,340 
LV  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  91.7  8.3  –  5,305 
LT  85.4  –  –  11.6  –  3.0  –  85.4  –  11.6  3.0  –  100.0  –  5,290 
LU  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  100.0  –  –  4,563 
HU  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  100.0  –  –  8,710 
NL  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  99.7  0.3  –  13,267 
AT  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  100.0  –  –  7,012 
PL  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  –  –  56.5  43.5  –  13,708 
PT  72.8  –  15.7  7.9  3.2  0.1  0.2  72.8  15.7  11.1  0.4  100.0  –  –  4,112 
SI  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  78.8  21.2  –  15,039 
SK  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  95.6  4.4  –  6,685 
FI  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  98.5  1.5  –  13,901 
SE  –  100.0  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  –  97.0  3.0  –  10,211 
UK  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  100.0  –  16.4  1.7  82.0  8,979 
Notes: Figures represent the shares of total observations with the features described in the column headings. For instance, in Belgium 99.9 per cent of net earnings were collected net of tax on income at source and social 
contributions and only 0.1 per cent was collected gross of these items. (1) Only individuals with positive gross earnings. 
Sources: authors’ elaboration on EU SILC users’ database (Version 2007–1, March 2009).  
 